Abstract. The Canvas protocol was developed by Harald Vogt [10] and should provide data integrity in Wireless Sensor Networks. However, Dieter Gollmann published [5] an attack on the protocol. This example supports a widespread belief that design of security protocols is notoriously error-prone. Therefore, it is required to use formal methods to analyze their security properties. In the paper we present design and analysis of a generalized Canvas protocol. We consider the fallacy of the Canvas scheme in different models of the attacker and present a solution for correcting the scheme. We discuss a motivation for generalization of the Canvas protocol and introduce a k-generalized version of the scheme for some parameter k ≥ 2. We build a formal model of the k-generalized Canvas protocol in the applied pi-calculus. This model includes a model of the network topology, communication channels, captured nodes, and capabilities of the attacker. In the semantic model of the applied picalculus we specify the data integrity property of the scheme. We prove that the proposed k-generalized Canvas scheme, in the presence of an active adversary, provides data integrity of messages assuming that at least one honest node exists on each path of the length k − 1 in the communication graph of a sensor network. Finally, we discuss the usability of the proposed formal model for other WSN security protocols.
Introduction
The development of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) was originally motivated by military applications. However, WSNs are now used in many civilian applications including environment monitoring, home automation, and traffic control. neighbors N i (v) of a node v ∈ V as the set of nodes u ∈ V such that exists a path ρ ∈ π i (G) starting in v and ending in u. The Canvas protocol was designed by H. Vogt and published in [8] [9] [10] . It should provide data integrity or data origin authentication [6] in a sensor network under assumption that captured nodes are isolated, i. e., captured nodes are not direct neighbors in a communication graph. Each node shares secret keys with nodes that are one or two hops away as shown in Fig. 1 . Message authentication codes -MACs [6] are used to protect the integrity of a message between nodes which share the secret key. Let K AB denote the key shared between nodes A and B, and h(m, K AB ) denote the MAC of a message m using the shared key K AB .
For the sake of simplicity, we explain the functionality of the Canvas scheme on a simple sensor network (Fig. 1) . The node A wants to initiate the transmission of a message m which must contain its identification. It selects two nodes B ∈ N 1 (A), C ∈ N 2 (A) on a valid communication path determined by a routing algorithm. The node A computes authenticators h(m, K AB ), h(m, K AC ) and sends the message m, h(m, K AB ), C, h(m, K AC ) to the node B.
In message routing we consider two cases when a node receives a message. In the first one, the node processes the message which was just initiated by an original sender. The node B receives a message m 1 , . . . , m 4 In the general case of message routing -following the example -the node C receives a message m 1 , . . . , m 6 from B. It verifies whether A = m 2 is a two-hop neighbor, i. e., A ∈ N 2 (C), and h(m 1 , K AC ) = m 3 ; the sender B is a one-hop neighbor, i. e., B ∈ N 1 (C), and h(m 1 , K BC ) = m 4 . If the tests succeed, the node B accepts the message. The next hop D in the route has been already chosen by B. However, the node C selects the next-next hop E ∈ N 2 (C) from the set of 2-hop neighbors on the valid path. Finally, it sends the routed message m 1 , B, m 6 , h(m 1 , K CD ), E, h(m 1 , K CE ) to the node D. Similarly, the node D continues in routing of the message.
The Security Fallacy of the Scheme. D. Gollmann showed an attack on the Canvas protocol in the paper [5] . He assumes an attacker model in which the attacker is able to capture a sensor device, gain control over it, and reprogram it. On the other hand, only nodes that were presented in the previous phases of the sensor network are allowed to participate in the network and the attacker cannot have access to the network with his own device. Moreover, captured devices can communicate only via established communication links of the sensor network. There is no channel between them and the adversary. In our opinion, it is problematic to model a cooperative strategy of captured nodes formally. This way, we consider this model unsuitable for a formal analysis.
Let the nodes A, C from Fig. 1 ), and sends them along with the fake authenticator h(m , K AE ) in the routed message to the node C. The compromised node C follows predefined malicious strategy and receives the authenticator h(m , K AE ) for the fake message m from B. It selects the node F as the next-next hop, computes h(m , K CE ), h(m , K CF ) and sends them along with h(m , K AE ) in the routed message to E. The node E checks whether the node C is a one-hop neighbor, the node A a two-hop neighbor, and all received authenticators. Then, it accepts the fake message m even though compromised nodes A, C are isolated.
We propose a model of the attacker, which differs from the above mentioned model. The adversary is able to capture a device and copy all stored data including secrets from the device. Moreover, the attacker can use pre-established communication links of the captured devices by using his own device. Furthermore, we can define the initial knowledge of the attacker about the network topology and communication links. In this model, the attack on the Canvas scheme is simpler and explains the fallacy of the scheme better. On the other hand, the model is stronger (we can easy simulate an attack from the above mentioned model) and more suitable for a formal analysis. First, the attacker obtains all secrets from the captured nodes A, C including the keys
and prepares the routed message of a fake message m of the false route A → C → E → F . Via the established channel between C and E he sends the routed message to the node E parades as C. The node E checks whether the node C is a one-hop neighbor, the node A is a two-hop neighbor, and all received authenticators. Then, the node E accepts the fake message m and follows to propagate the message m to the node F .
In order to fix the scheme we need to avoid invalid routes in the sensor network as was suggested in [5] . However, it is sufficient to check whether previous hops in the route are on a valid communication path. This way, a node v during receiving a routed message from a previous hop p 1 and a previous-previous hop p 2 not only checks whether p 1 ∈ N 1 (v) and p 2 ∈ N 2 (v), but it needs to verify whether p 2 p 1 v is a valid path, i. e., p 2 p 1 v ∈ π 2 (G). Note that the knowledge of a node about the local topology was specified as an assumption in [10] and it is used implicitly in the routing algorithm by selecting a next-next hop on a valid path. Thus, we do not add new requirements for previous phases of the protocol. However, we specify explicitly what is necessary to assume and check in the operational phase of the Canvas protocol.
Generalized Canvas Scheme

Motivation
Our aim is to generalize the Canvas scheme, in order to protect the data integrity of the message witnessed by k previous hops in the routing. We assume that each node v has established shared keys with nodes from the sets of neighbors N 1 (v), . . . , N k (v). Moreover, the node v knows information about its local topology up to the distance k. This way the node v can check the validity of a path of the length k ending in v.
The k-generalized Canvas scheme should provide data integrity under the assumption that at least one node which is not captured exists on each path of the length k − 1 in the communication graph. We distinguish between two kinds of sensor devices -protected and unprotected. The attacker is unable to copy secrets from a protected device. This property can be realized by making the protected device tamper-resistant or placing the protected device on a safe location, where capture is problematic. On the other hand, an unprotected device can be captured by the attacker, who can also copy secrets from the device and gain control over it. During the deployment and initialization of a sensor network, it should be ensured, that at least one protected node exists on each path of the length k − 1 in the communication graph. This can be realized by appropriate geometrical covering of an area of the sensor network by protected devices during the deployment. The initialization phase of the sensor network is realized with respect to the required property and the communication graph is modified when necessary. Another possibility is to randomly distribute protected and unprotected devices with sufficient ratio of protected ones and maintain a communication graph with respect to the required property. Finally, the last idea is based on a planned deployment of the sensor network with minimization of the number of protected devices due to increased costs. Building a topology of a sensor network with the minimal number of protected devices could be a problem of independent interest in the field of combinatorial optimization.
A Proposed Scheme
Let us denote a concatenation of strings s 1 , s 2 as s 1 ||s 2 and a string representation of an integer i ≤ k as i . We define a chain of message authentication codes of a message m under keys K 1 , . . . , K n as 
Message routing. We consider k cases when a node receives a message. In the first k −1 cases, the node processes the message routed up to k −1 hops since the initiation. The last case is more general, the node receives the message which has been routed at least k − 1 steps and has to forward it towards selected destinations.
It checks whether m contains the identification of the node A 0 and the path A 0 A 1 is valid, i. e., the node A 0 is its direct neighbor. Then, it compares the authenticator h( 1 ||m, K A 1 A 0 ) with h 1 . If the tests succeed, the node A 1 accepts the message. It nominates a next node in the route following the node A k , i. e., the node A k+1 in the selected path ρ. Then, it computes the authenticator h k+1 = h( 1 ||m, K A1A k+1 ) designated for the node A k+1 . It also updates received authenticators, i. e., for each j ∈ {2, . . . , k} the node computes 
Finally, it sends the message m, A 0 , . . . , A k+i , h i+1 , . . . , h k+i to the node A j .
-Normal routing of a message at l-th step since the initiation, where l > k −1. 
Note that during the update of an authenticator
. However, the node needs to check the right type, i. e., the right size of the received authenticator in order to avoid a type-flaw attack.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not define the process of completing the routing. In the case, when a node does not want to continue in routing of a message, it does not select a next node following the last chosen and also skips the corresponding authenticator. However, the node has to forward the message with updated authenticators to already selected next node. Similarly, already chosen nodes -up to the last one -continue to complete the routing.
A Formal Model of the k-Generalized Canvas Scheme
The Applied-Pi Calculus
The applied pi-calculus [1] is a language for describing concurrent processes and their interactions. It is based on the pi-calculus, but is intended to be less pure and therefore more convenient to use. Moreover, the applied pi-calculus allows us to define less usual communication and cryptographic primitives by defining function symbols and some equivalences on terms. We briefly describe the syntax and the operational semantics of the applied pi-calculus from the paper [3] . In the set of function symbols we distinguish between constructors and destructors. Constructors are used to build terms. On the other hand, destructors do not appear in terms, but only manipulate terms in processes. Moreover, we distinguish between private and public function symbols. Public function symbols can be used by an adversary, but he is forbidden to use private ones. The set of terms is built from names, variables and constructors applied to other terms. Note that the terms are untyped and the calculus is monadic.
Syntax and Informal Semantics. Plain processes are defined as follows. The nil process 0 does nothing; νa.P generates a fresh name a and then behaves as P ; if M = N then P else Q behaves as P if M = N and as Q otherwise; P |Q executes P and Q in parallel; !P generates an unbounded number of copies of P ; event M.P executes an event M and then behaves as P ; N (x).P receives a message M on a channel N and then behaves as P {M/x}, where x is bound to the input message M ; N M .P outputs a message M on a channel N and then executes P . Note that channels can be arbitrary terms, not only names. We abbreviate if M = N then P when Q = 0, a batch of parallel compositions
The name a is bound in the process νa.P . The variable x is bound in P in the processes N (x).P and let x = M in P . A process is closed if it has no free variables; it may have free names. The process let
if it succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is executed, else Q is executed. More precisely, the semantics of a destructor g of arity n is given by a set def(g) of rewrite rules of the 
Operational Semantics and Traces. We use the definition of operational semantics of the applied pi-calculus from the paper [3] . This semantics is superficially different from [1] where is defined using structural congruence relation and reduction relation on processes. However, it provides simplification in a definition of the data integrity property and in a proof that the property holds.
A semantic configuration is a pair E, P where the environment E is a finite set of names and P is a finite multiset of closed processes. The environment E must contain at least all free names of processes in P. The semantic configuration {a 1 , . . . , a n }, {P 1 , . . . , P m } corresponds intuitively to the process νa 1 . . . νa n (P 1 | . . . |P m ). The semantics of the calculus is defined by a reduction relation −→ on semantic configurations as shown in Fig. 2 . Note that the equality in conditional rules 6-7 means syntactic equality.
We say that a trace T = E 0 , P 0 −→ n E n , P n satisfies message (N, M ) and denote T m (N, M ) if and only if the trace T contains a reduction E, P ∪ {N M .Q, N (x).P } −→ E, P ∪ {Q, P {M/x}} for some E, P, x, P, Q. Intuitively, the trace satisfies message (N, M ) when the message M has been sent on the channel N .
We say that a trace T = E 0 , P 0 −→ n E n , P n satisfies event M and denote T e M if and only if T contains a reduction E, P ∪ {event M.P } −→ E, P ∪ {P } for some E, P, P . Intuitively, the trace satisfies event M when the event M has been executed.
We say that a trace
A Formal Model of the Scheme
Public Function Symbols. For the sake of clarity in the formal model of the scheme, we use formatted routed messages R 1 , . . . , R k with fixed number of fields. We introduce public constructors R k /3k + 1, R i /2k + i + 1, for all i < k. Public constructors T n /n, for all 2 ≤ n ≤ k + 1 are used for creating n-tuples. However, we denote tuples using standard notation as ( , . . . , ). In addition, we introduce inverse, unary function symbols -public destructors F
for selecting a field in the routed message R 1 . This way, we add rewrite rules F R1 i (R 1 (x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . , x 2k+2 )) −→ x i . Similarly, we add rewrite rules for public destructors F In order to model message authentication codes we introduce a binary function symbol -a public constructor h/2, with no corresponding destructor. The fact that h(m, K) = h(m , K ) only when m = m and K = K models that h is collision-free. The absence of a destructor for h models the one-wayness of h. We do not introduce a special function symbol for the chain of message authentication codes. We use the notation H(m, K 1 , . . . , K n ) as an abbreviation of the recursively defined term
For this purpose, we add public constant constructors 1/0, . . . , k/0 into the set of function symbols. Note that the concatenation of strings is represented by tuples. Both string representations of the depth of the chain of MACs and MACs have known size. This way, one can select a field of the concatenated message similar to tuples.
Proof. The direction ⇐ is trivial. We prove the opposite direction by induction according to the depth n of the term (m , H(m , K 1 , . . . , K n−1 ))), K n ) = h ((1, m) , K 1 ). Therefore n = 1 and h ((1, m), K 1 ) = h((1, m ) , K 1 ) only when m = m and
Let us assume that for j < n is the statement true and n > 1. We have (m, H(m, K 1 , . . . , K n−1 )) (m, H(m, K 1 , . . . , K n−1 ))), K n ). Therefore it must hold that n > 1 and from the equation h((n, (m, H(m, K 1 (m , H(m , K 1 , . . . , K n −1 ))), K n ) we obtain two equalities K n = K n and (n, (m, H(m, K 1 
and n = n . Finally, from the induction hypothesis we obtain m = m , n = n and
Processes of the k-Generalized Canvas protocol.
We define a formal model of the k-generalized Canvas scheme for a sensor network and a fixed security parameter k ≥ 2. The network is represented by a communication graph G = (V, E), where |V | = n G . We distinguish between two kinds of nodes: captured and honest. Let a set of captured nodes be C ⊆ V and a set of honest nodes V \ C. Note that the communication graph and the set of captured nodes are static and do not change during the operational phase of the scheme.
An active adversary is represented by any closed process interacting with the below defined process Network(G, C, k), which has a set of public names in its initial knowledge, can use public function symbols, and does not contain events. Actions of the attacker are not explicitly defined. However, the initial knowledge of the attacker contains a free name of the public "attacker" channel c A . In the beginning, the attacker obtains identifications and channels of captured nodes from the process Network(G, C, k). The attacker can use these channels for receiving messages. Moreover, he retrieves identifications and communication channels of nodes which are direct neighbors of captured nodes. The attacker can communicate via these channels. He also gains all established keys of the captured nodes shared with their neighbors up to the distance k and information about the local topology of the captured nodes. On the other hand, the attacker is forbidden to communicate via private channels.
We define the whole process of the sensor network Network(G, C, k) for a security parameter k and a communication graph G = (V, E) with respect to a set of captured nodes C as -Topology distributes mainly information about the local topology of nodes.
First, the process executes an event CAPTURED(id u ) for each captured node u ∈ C and an event HONEST(id v ) for each honest node v ∈ V \ C. Then, the process sends:
• a message (id v , c v ) on the "attacker" public channel c A , for each captured node v ∈ C and for each v ∈ V \C, such that exists u ∈ C and u ∈ N 1 (v); • a message (id v0 , . . . , id v k ) on the "attacker" public channel c A , for all 
A node x 0 can receive a nondeterministic choice of a next node which follows k nodes x 0 , . . . , x k−1 on valid path via the private channel p S (x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ). -Key provides access to established shared keys. In the beginning of the process Network(G, C, k), exactly one key is generated for each pair of nodes when the distance between them is up to k. For each key K i shared between nodes u, v ∈ V , such that the distance between them is up to k, the process contains the parallel composition of !p
A node x can receive the key shared with a node y via the private channel p K (x, y). -Channel provides a name of the communication channel of a node for its direct neighbor. The process is defined as
A node can receive the name of communication channel of a node x via the private channel p
Ch (x). -Node describes the behavior of a sensor device as shown in Fig. 3 . First, the process obtains its identification id and the name of channel c for receiving messages via the private channel p Top (line 1). Then, the process consists of the parallel composition of processes: 
A Formal Analysis of the Data Integrity Property
Definition 1 (Data integrity). We say that a trace
the data integrity property if and only if in all subtraces T T hold:
(T e HONEST(z) ∧ T e ACCEPT(x, y, z)) ⇒ (T e INIT(x, y) ∨ T e CAPTURED(y)).
N ode c1 R1((id, m), id, A1, . . . , A k , h((1, (id, m)), K1), . . . , h((1, (id, m) (R i ((o, m), A 0 , . . . , A k+i−1 , h i , . . . , h k+i−1 ) ) .
Fig. 3. The process Node
Intuitively, a trace satisfies the data integrity property when during all reductions of the trace if an honest node z accepts a message x originated from a node y, then the node y has already initiated the message x or the node y is captured. -in the message initiation ( Fig. 3 line 5 ). Then i = j = 1, (r = o, or s = o) and the event INIT(m, o) must be executed. -in the message routing (Fig. 3 lines 11, 17) . Then, the event ACCEPT (m, o, s (Fig. 3 lines 5 Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. Let us assume that the statement is not true. Therefore, there exists a communication graph G , a set of captured nodes C , and a parameter k ≥ 2, such that on each path of the length k −1 in G there exists at least one honest node. There also exists a closed process that represents the active adversary interacting with the process Network(G , C , k). For the whole process there exists a trace which does not satisfy the integrity property. Hence, there must exist its subtrace
From the trace T , we take subtraces T , T T in order to have two traces
e HONEST(id ), and there is no x ∈ E q−1 such that T e HONEST(x) and T e ACCEPT(m , o , x). From the trace T , it holds T e INIT(m , o ) and T e CAPTURED(o ). Intuitively, the honest node id is the first honest node that accepts the message m originated from o exactly at q-th reduction step in the trace T . Therefore, in the trace T , which is a subtrace of T of the length q − 1 reductions, the message m originated from o is not accepted by any honest node x. Note that the node id can be the same node as id .
According to the definition of the process Node, the node id receives its name id and a channel name c on the private channel p Top . More formally, there exists c ∈ E q−1 such that T m (p Top , (id , c ) ). We consider all cases, when the event ACCEPT(m , o , id ) could occur in the trace T :
-i-hop after initiation, where i ≤ k − 1. According to the definition of the appropriate part of the process Node (Fig. 3 lines 6-9 ), there must exist , m ) 
.)).
We consider all possibilities according to the honesty of previous hops A −k , . . . , A −1 in the route:
• All previous hops are captured, i. e., T e CAPTURED(A j ) for all j ∈ {−k, . . . , −1}. With respect to the definition of the process Node (Fig. 3 line 14) , we have T m (p 
Conclusion
In the paper we presented design and analysis of a k-generalized Canvas protocol. We discussed a motivation for generalization of the Canvas protocol and proposed a k-generalized version of the scheme. The design of the scheme combines the property of the communication graph of the sensor network with the used message authentication codes. In particular, for the case k = 2 we improved the Canvas scheme, since in the routed message only two authenticators are sent, fewer than three in the original scheme. Similar problem was studied in [12] where Zhu et al. proposed the scheme which protects against false data injection attacks. In future work we would like to consider application of the proposed k-generalized Canvas scheme for this and similar problems stated in literature.
We built a formal model of the k-generalized Canvas protocol in the applied pi-calculus. This model includes a model of the network topology, communication channels, captured nodes and capabilities of the attacker. Development of this kind of model was formulated as a challenge in the computer security research field [5] . In the semantic model of the applied pi-calculus we specified the data integrity property of the scheme. Finally, we proved that proposed k-generalized Canvas scheme in the presence of an active adversary provides the data integrity of messages. We proved the property for a security parameter k ≥ 2, an arbitrary communication graph and a set of captured nodes assuming that at least one honest node exists on each path of the length k − 1 in the communication graph. The proposed formal model could be applied to other WSN security protocols as well. In future work we are planning to analyze other WSN security protocols focusing on different phases of the sensor network in order to model the abilities of an adversary in more detail. The applied pi-calculus allows us to model various cryptographic primitives. Moreover, the Proverif tool [4] can be used for automatical verification of correspondences [3] . Unfortunately, an automatical analysis could be done for a concrete communication graph and a set of captured nodes.
